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Directors’ liability: the rules of the game

20 November 2026

Anyone who takes on a directorship in a company or association is not only granted the authority to help steer that organisation. That authority also comes with responsibilities. If a director makes mistakes whilst carrying out their duties, they may, in certain circumstances, be held personally liable.

This does not mean that every misjudgement, unfortunate decision or disappointing investment automatically leads to liability. After all, doing business involves risks, and directors cannot be expected to predict the future without error. However, it is important that directors know and understand the key rules, so that they can carry out their mandate in a diligent and informed manner.

This article forms the first part of a wider series of articles on directors’ liability. In this first article, we set out the general principles and the legal framework surrounding directors’ liability. In the following articles, we will examine a number of specific grounds for liability and practical considerations in greater depth.

1.      Directors’ liability in many forms

Directors may face various grounds for liability whilst carrying out their duties. Broadly speaking, three categories can be distinguished.

a)      Directors’ liability under company law

The first category concerns general directors’ liability under company law. The basic principle of this is set out in Article 2:56 of the Belgian Code of companies and associations (the ‘BCCA). Under this provision, directors may be held liable for errors they commit in the course of their duties. This provision applies not only to directors of companies, but in principle also to the directors of other legal entities governed by the BCCA, including associations and foundations.

Within this general category, various types of errors are conceivable. For example, a director may fail to exercise the general standard of care expected of him or her. In addition, a director may breach a specific provision of the BCCA or the articles of association. Examples include failure to comply with the conflict of interest procedure, the late preparation or filing of the annual accounts, failure to apply the ‘alarm bell’ procedure, or taking a decision outside the legal or statutory powers of the governing body.

 

b)      Directors’ liability in the event of insolvency

A second category comprises the specific grounds for liability in the context of insolvency. When a company is in financial difficulties, the responsibilities of its directors require particular attention. Book XX of the Code of Economic Law (the “WER”) sets out specific grounds for liability in this regard, including for a manifestly gross fault that has contributed to the bankruptcy.

 

c)      Grounds for liability within specific areas of law

A third category comprises the administrative, tax, social security and criminal grounds for liability that originate outside the context of company law. The applicable obligations can vary significantly depending on the sector in which a company or association operates. Directors may, for example, face liability risks in the areas of taxation, social legislation, environmental law, data protection, anti-money laundering or health and safety at work. Furthermore, certain breaches are subject to criminal sanctions. A directorship must therefore always be considered within the broader regulatory framework in which the organisation in question operates.

These three categories are not necessarily distinct from one another. Depending on the circumstances, the same conduct may fall under several grounds for liability. For example, a failure to monitor a company’s financial position adequately may constitute both a general breach of duty by a director and a breach in the context of insolvency. In certain cases, criminal liability may also arise.

In this series of articles, we use the term ‘directors’ liability’ in principle exclusively to refer to general directors’ liability under company law, unless specifically stated otherwise.

 

2.      What is expected of a director?

Article 2:51 of the Belgian Code of companies and associations stipulates that every director is obliged to perform the duties entrusted to him or her with due care. Behind this seemingly simple rule lies a broad and multifaceted range of duties.

In general terms, the board of directors must steer the enterprise and strive to achieve its objectives. In the case of a company, this means that the directors determine the policy and strategy, whilst always acting in the company’s best interests. According to the Belgian Court of Cassation, the company’s best interests are defined, somewhat cryptically, as ‘the collective profit interests of its current and future shareholders’, leaving room for interpretation by the courts. In any event, it must be emphasised that the interests of a company may differ from those of its parent company. In the case of associations, the governing body must ensure that the non-profit objective for which the association was established is realised.

In addition, the Belgian Code of companies and associations imposes a number of specific obligations directly on the governing body, such as the preparation of the draft annual accounts and the annual report, the timely filing of the annual accounts and the application of the alarm bell procedure. These obligations are generally regarded as obligations to achieve a specific result and fall within the governing body’s own responsibility. Consequently, they cannot simply be delegated to others.

More specifically, the board of a company has the following core tasks:

  • Steering the company: The governing body determines the company’s general direction and strategy. It may entrust the implementation of operational policy to certain persons entrusted with (daily) management, particularly where specific technical or operational expertise is required.
  • Exercising oversight: The governing body supervises management and monitors how the company is run. To this end, it must ensure that it has sufficient and reliable information at its disposal in a timely manner.
  • Providing advice to management and staff: The governing body acts as a sounding board for management. It discusses important policy proposals, assesses the underlying principles and risks, and makes adjustments where necessary. This role requires directors to act independently, be sufficiently informed and look beyond the information presented to them.

 

3.      Internal and external directors’ liability

A distinction is made between the internal and external liability of directors.

Internal directors’ liability relates to the relationship between the director and the legal entity in which he or she exercises their mandate. The director has a contractual obligation towards that legal entity to perform the assigned management duties properly. If a director fails to do so and the legal entity suffers loss as a result, the legal entity may hold the director liable under certain conditions. The decision to bring a liability claim against a director on behalf of a company falls within the powers of the general meeting.

Since the abolition of the prohibition on the concurrence of contractual and non-contractual liability under Book 6 of the Civil Code, it has become easier for a company to bring a non-contractual liability claim against a director. This will be discussed in more detail in a later article.

External directors’ liability, on the other hand, concerns a director’s liability towards third parties. This includes creditors, contracting parties, employees, public authorities or other persons who have suffered loss as a result of a director’s fault. Just as anyone can be held liable for their wrongful acts, a director may also be liable outside of a contract for errors they make whilst performing their duties as a director.

 

4.      Not every error leads to liability

The finding that a director has committed a fault is not, in itself, sufficient to establish liability. In principle, three conditions must be met in both internal and external director liability: there must be a fault, damage and a causal link between the two. The person holding the director liable must prove these conditions, unless a specific statutory provision provides for a different standard of proof or a presumption.

The fault may consist of a breach of a specific legal obligation or an obligation under the articles of association. In addition, a director may be at fault for failing to act as might be expected of a normally prudent and diligent director in the same circumstances.

Furthermore, actual damage must have been suffered. A mere breach of a rule without demonstrable damage will, in principle, not give rise to an obligation to pay compensation. Finally, it must be demonstrated that the damage is the result of the fault. If the same damage would have occurred even without the fault, the required causal link is, in principle, lacking.

In certain cases, the law provides the aggrieved party with a presumption. For example, in the event of late submission or filing of the annual accounts, the damage suffered by third parties is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to result from that omission. It is therefore always important to identify the precise statutory provision applicable in each case.


5.      Discretion and the marginal liability test

Directors often make decisions on the basis of incomplete information and in circumstances where several reasonable choices are possible. The fact that an investment fails, a new activity does not achieve the hoped-for success, or a commercial strategy subsequently proves unfavourable, does not automatically mean that the director has committed a fault.

Article 2:56 of the Code of companies and associations therefore stipulates that directors are only liable for decisions, acts or conduct that are manifestly outside the margin within which normally prudent and diligent directors, placed in the same circumstances, might reasonably differ in their views. This is referred to as the marginal test.

The court must not, therefore, retrospectively substitute its own discretion for that of the governing body. In its assessment, the court must always guard against the risk of hindsight bias and must assess the decision on the basis of the circumstances and information available at the time, without being guided by its ultimate consequences. In this way, directors retain the necessary scope to take reasonable business risks, even when the outcome is uncertain.

However, the marginal test is not a free pass. It protects reasonable policy choices, but not manifestly negligent decisions. Furthermore, there is little to no discretion when it comes to compliance with clear legal obligations or obligations under the articles of association, such as the timely filing of the annual accounts or the correct application of the alarm bell procedure.

It is therefore not only the substance of a board decision that matters, but also the manner in which it is reached. The governing body should gather the relevant information, weigh up the main risks and, ideally, clearly record the reasoning behind important decisions in the minutes. This makes it possible to demonstrate retrospectively the context in which the decision was taken and the reasonable grounds on which it was based.

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